Supply and demand functions are typically estimated using uniform prices and quantifies across products, but where .products are heterogeneous, it is important tO Consider quality differences explicitly. This paper demonstrates a new approach to doing this by employing hedonic coefficients to estimate price elasticities for differentiated products in the market for personal computers. Differences among products are modeled as distances in a linear quality space_ derived from a multi-dimensional attribute space. Heterogeneous quality allows for the estimation of varying demand elasticities among models, using models' relative positions as measures of market power. Instead of restricting market competition to the two nearest models, as is .typically done in the differentiated-product literature, cross-elasticities of substitution are allowed to decline continuously with distance between models in quality space.
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Introduction
Supply and demand functions are typically estimated using uniform prices and quantities across products, yielding a single industry-wide demand elasticity estimate. However, most industries are characterized by multiproduct firms producing differentiated rather than uniform goods. Each product is likely to face a different demand elasticity. It would be misleading, for example, to use a single estimate of demand elasticity for a Mercedes and a Ford Escort. Instead, individual products' attributes and their market position should be used in demand elasticity estimation.
Beginning with Rosen (1974) , economists have employed various means of estimating demand and supply for differentiated products or individual attributes, There is still no agreement as to the best way to estimate demand elasticities for products differentiated in several attributes.
Recent studies include Bresnahan (1981) , Levinsohn (1988) , Trajtenberg (1990) , Berry (1992) , Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) , and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) . A large number of products forces the analysts to place strong restrictions on demand to avoid estimating thousands of elasticities. In most of the studies, models are assumed to compete only with their two nearest competitors. However, a sufficient drop in price could presumably make consumers move to a different market segment, making the assumption too stringent. Cross-elasticities are often estimated only after the market is aggregated to two general types of products (see Bresnahan (1989) for review).
This paper provides a new application of hedonic coefficients in the estimation of price -2-elasticities for differentiated products. In the context of the market for personal computers (PCs), differences among products are modeled as distances in a linear quality space derived from a multi-dimensional attribute space using hedonic coefficients as weights. I design a supply and demand model that allows for variation in demand elasticities among differentiated products and over time. The relative positions of models in the quality space measure their market power.
Instead of restricting market competition to the two nearest models, a new method allows crosselasticities of substitution to decline continuously with distance in the quality spectrum.
Two-stage least squares estimates of demand elasticities vary across models and over time, and are consistent with observed changes in market structure. Entrants are found to face more elastic demand than incumbents, although the difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, new models were found to face more elastic demand than models which had been on the market for one or two years. Using the estimates of demand elasticities, I compute two measures of industry-level profitability: the annual price-cost markups and the total profit-revenue ratio. Both measures indicate a significant decline in profitability with the increase in market competition over hme.
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections II and III describe the theoretical models of demand and supply, respectively, leading to two estimable equations. Section IV describes the data, while section V provides estimation results. Section VI discusses industry profitability changes. Section VII concludes.
H. Demand
Personal computers are vertically differentiated products, where "more" of a given 6~z~ -o~P,. *gm > 6~z~ -o~P~ -~ ga for all n Assuming that the willingness to pay t~or quality equals 6i = ~ + q)i, so that E(6i) = 6z~ -c~P m + am -~ (P~ z~ _> 6z~ -ocP~ + g~ + q)i Zn for all n am -~a + (Pi (zm -z~) >_ (6z,, -czP~) -(6z m -czP~) for all n I can specify the probability of buying model m by consumer i as:
The only horizontal aspect of PC models is IBM-compatibihty. The feature was controlled for by the inclusion of firm dummies.
ARhough tastes vary, in the case of vertically differentiated products consumers care mainly about quality, and higher prices indicate higher costs. In the case of horizontally differentiated goods, heterogeneity of tastes is much more important in demand determination (e.g., if a black refrigerator costs more than a white one, it is probably due to the distribution of taste rather than a cost difference). Therefore ignoring the heterogeneity in taste and income in demand for PCs is not as important as in the case of other commodities. Since the model price is itself a function of attributes, including both prices and model attributes in the regression would create multicollinearity, making it difficult to interpret the results. Consumers care about prices and attributes simultaneously, and not independently. I can -5-therefore constrain 5=c~ . Market share is a function of quality-adj usted prices of PC models, 5 but I include firm effects in the equation separately to control for brand reputation effects.
Market share of model m produced by firm i in year t (s,,,~t) , allowing for varying coefficients on all other models' prices, becomes:
Own demand (market share) changes with own quality-adjusted price (the coefficient is proportional to own price elasticity of demand) and with quality-adjusted prices of substitutes (the coefficients represent cross-elasticities of demand). 6 Unlike Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) , I do not assume that two models with identical technical specifications are perfect substitutes. My model allows for brand effects, hence firm dummies in the demand equation.
A.° Cross-Elasticities of Demand
The above equation presents an estimation problem. Even in a one-hundred product market there are 10,000 cross-elasticity coefficients to estimate, and the PC market has over 300 models in some years. Analysts have typically imposed stringent constraints on demand 5 Trajtenberg (1990) used hedonic residuals in his CT scanners analysis, a similar measure to quali .ty-adjusted
prices.
An alternative method of market share estimation involves selecting one model as a base: So ~ e S z~-and estimating relative market shares: In (s,~/s0) = (z~ -z0) 8 -(P~ -Po) oz. The specification does not allow for cross-elasticity estimation, however.
-6-structure: either each product competes with its two nearest neighbors only (e.g., Bresnahan (1981) ), or all the products are summarized by two general types (e.g., Gelfand and Spiller (1987) ). Even though I reduced the quality to a single dimension, I did not restrict market competition to the two nearest models--a sufficiently large price drop for a model located further away could make it a valid substitute.
A cross-elasticity between a pair of products depends on the degree of substitution between them. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the more similar are two models' attributes (i.e., the closer to each other they are located in the product space), the more customers would consider them to be substitutes. The cross-elasticity of demand between models rn and n can therefore be assumed to be inversely proportional to the distance in quality space between -~2 / The specification al!ows each model to have a non-zero cross-elasticity with them:~ _ 2ran dmn each of the other products on the market.
B.
Own Price Elasticities of Demand
Own price and prices of substitutes are not the only factors that affect demand. Just as a monopolist faces more inelastic demand than does a competitive firm, a model with market power is likely to face more inelastic demand than a model with several substitutes. The market power can be measured by whether the model is located in a "crowded" or an "'erapty" area in the quality space. If a model is located in a crowded area, its price increase will have a bigger effect on its market share than if there were no models around it. I measure the "crowding" with the average distance from other models To account for each model's market power, I weigh own quality-adjusted prices by the average distance from each model's substitutes, ~l~n. The The assumption that own demand elasticity and cross-elasticities depend on the distance from other models is motivated by the utility function in equation (1). Since a model's relative location (or quality) enters the consumers' utility function, each model's demand elasticity depends on its location in the quality space, not just on its quality-adjusted price. The assumption allows to distinguish between a mode! with a low price and low quality, and a model 7 The linear approximation facilitated the inclusion of all the competitors in cross-elasticity of demand estimation. The nonlinear equation (5) was estimated including two nearest neighbors, then four, six, eight, and finally ten nearest neighboring models. In all the regressions, while the coefficient on the neighbors' prices was insignificant, the coefficient on own price remained identical. The linearization did not, therefore, bias the estimates, and was used when all the competing models were included in the regression.
SFeenstraandLevinsohn (1995) used a harmonic mean of distances: H = ( 2 )-I means generated higher standard errors and a lower explanatory power than arithmetic means. problem of division by 0.
Using harmonic
It also created a -8-with a high price and high quality. The two would face different demand elasticities, their quality-adjusted prices were identical. even if
IH. Supply
Firms engage in a two-stage game: in stage one they enter or exit the market, and decide which models to produce; i.e., they compete in spatial location of models in the model quality space. I analyzed the first stage in Stavins (1995) . Stage two is a Bertrand-Nash competition in prices: each firm chooses own models' prices to maximize its profit, taking other firms' prices and all the models' location as fixed. 9 Therefore, the attributes of models produced are predetermined in the second stage:
Each firm i chooses prices of all its models, P,,~ to maximize its profit in year t, ~to The quantity sold of each model equals its market share, sm~t (a function of prices), times the quantity of all PCs sold, Qt. Model-specific fixed costs, such as retail agreements, advertising, and box design, give rise to economies of scale; the fixed cost is allowed to decrease with the number ofm odels the firm has produced in the past, exhibiting economies of scope. Marginal cost does not change with the number of units produced, 1° although it does increase with the attributes embodied:
s Fixed costs of a new model can be assumed sufficiently large for the assumption to hold.
lo No individual producer is assumed to be large enough to create a monopsony effect on the marginal prices of PC components, largely manufactured by other firms.
-9- (7) where M~i t is the number of models by firm i in year t, Cmi t is the marginal cost of model m, Fmi t is the fixed cost of model m, and ~ Mi, is the cumulative number of models produced before Differentiating equation (7) with respect to the model's price gives the following first order condition:
or:
Substituting for all the partials from the market share equation (6):
Equation (9) shows that price equals marginal cost (trait) plus price-cost margin (PCM).
c,~t is a function of model attributes, while PCM increases with the model's market power, which is higher the larger is the model's distance from other firms' models ( _ 1> 0 from -10-equation (6)). In other words, the closer the model is located to other firms' models, its price is to its marginal cost: as ~t~n --~ 0 ~ Pmit --~ Cmit" approximated by its relative position in the quality space.
competitive, distance from other models should have no effect on price. also higher, the higher the markups on other models by the same firm are, (such as management and reputation advantages). 
P --O-÷
02)
Price is therefore a function of model attributes (z) and of the average distance from models by other firms (~)~n), as well as the average distance from own models (~r.m')" Both model attributes and model location in the product space are exogenous in the second stage of the market game,
IV. Data
The initial data set includes annual prices and technical attributes for new personal computers sold in the United States from 1976 to 1988.11 The data set is an unbalanced panel.
A model is identified by its brand name. Several models have multiple observations in a given year, corresponding to different versions of the same model offered. Some models may appear with the same set of specifications in the retail and discount markets in the same year. The retail data include list prices of PC models based on their technical reviews, or models sold by their brand-name manufacturers, while discount data are for models sold by other sources.
The data set was merged with a data set containing PC shipment quantities per year, obtained from International Data Corporation (IDC). The IDC data did not cover all of the PC models in my sample. Therefore only the overlap of the two data sets--972 observations, or two-thirds of the initial dataset, had quantity data. There are no quantity data for the year 1976.
n The data were originally collected by Cohen (1988) , and later updated by Kim (1989) . Sources include technical model reviews in June issues of Byte, PC Magazine, and PC World for list prices and attributes, as well as ads in the Business section of June issues of The Sunday New £ork Times for discount prices. Some evidence of the changing market structure can be observed in Table 1 . Both the
13-
Herfindahl index and C(3) 12 decreased over time. Figure 1 shows changes in average model market shares for some leading firms as well as for the entire sample, where the average model market share decreased continuously since 1978.
V. Estimation
My goal is to estimate demand elasticities, as specified in equation (6) as proxies for-such firm attributes as service support. The measure was then used in the computation ofthe distance between models: dmn = ~(13"z~ -13'z~) 2 = ~(q~-q~)2 Average distance from all other models, clan, is dmn divided by the number of models. Its mean, by year, is shown in Figure 2 . Descriptive statistics on the major variables are listed in Table 3 .
The supply equation regresses price on model attributes and distances from other models.
The hypothesis is consistent with Feenstra and Levinsokn's (1995) finding.
Including all of tlae competing models' attributes would more than exhaust the degrees of freedom.
The results of that regression are in Table 2 . A similar hedonic specification was used by Berndt and Oriliches (1993) and Stavins (1995) .
Since model selection was done in stage one of (he game, model location in the quality space can be treated as exogenous in stage two. 17 The price equation was estimated using OLS. Because of possible heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors were estimated. The results are reported in Table 4 . Including firm dummies did not alter the distance coefficients spatial location effects cannot be explained by brand effects.
As expected, the average distance from other firms' models has a positive effect on model price: models located in "empty" areas have a local monopoly power, which raises their pricecost margin. The coefficient on the average distance from own models is negative, but insignificant, It is possible that the market penetration effect and the own market segment strengthening effec~ counteract each other.
I compared the results to the hedonic regression results. The difference between the two models is the inclusion of the distance measures in the price regression. I reject the hypothesis that the distance measures' coefficients are jointly equal to 0 at the 1% level, even though I cannot reject the hypothesis that coefficients remained unchanged between the two models.
The above result has an important implication--since all the quality coefficients remained unchanged, the quality measure based on the hedonic regression is equal to the quality measure based on the price regression. Therefore the estimated price will be the same whether quality is computed first and used in the distance computation (as above) or the estimation is done in a single step. Table 5 .1(
1)
Own price elasticity of demand.
The coefficients on own quality-adjusted prices are negative and significant in both specifications. Deriving from equation (6), demand elasticity equals: The specification allows for different demand elasticities for each model, depending on each model's relative market position in the quality space.
The 2SLS price coefficient yields an average estimated elasticity of demand of 6.3 18 Since I am interested mainly in demand effects, a better set of attribute weights would have been marginal utilities of the characteristics (instead of marginal costs), but they are not available. 9 I did not estimate the market share equation using logit, because of logit's independence of irrelevanã lternatives property. In the case of choosing among the PC models, consumers' utility would most Iikety increase with a larger choice of PCs. Furthermore, I have no information about the consumers purchasing individual models.
17-
(applying the formula above), ranging from 2.9 in 1977 to 7.2 in 1988. 2° The estimates are consistent with the imperfectly competitive market structure of the PC industry. As Figure 3 shows, the estimated average demand elasticity increased over time (in absolute value), as the industry became more competitive. There is a significant difference between the initial few years and ~he post-1982 period, when several PC clones entered the market.
(2) Cross-elasticity of demand
The cross-elasticity coefficient on prices of substitutes was insignificant in all the specifications. 2a I tested Bresnahan's (!981) hypothesis that a model competes only with its two nearest neighbors in a linear quality space. Only the two nearest models were entered into the market share equation. The cross-price coefficient was still insignificant. The equation was reestimated severa! times, by adding two more neighbors in each subsequent run. Each time the cross-price coefficient remained insignificant, while the own quality-adjusted price coefficient did not change at all. The own price elasticity result is thus robust--regardless of how many "neighbors" the model is allowed to compete with, the effect of its own price on its market share does not change. The insignificant effect of other models' prices could be the result of simultaneous price changes of PC models due to the competitive structure of the industry. The average distance was included in the estimation to allow for a separate effect of spatial location on the model's market share. Other speeifieatimas included an average quality-a~usted price of substitutes, as well as residuals from tlae hedonic regression. The coefficient was always statistically insignificant.
-18 -(3) Firm effects.
Positive coefficients on major firm dummies indicate that those firms had a higher market share than predicted by the quality-adjusted prices of their models. The brand effect on model market share equals e~. For example, the 2SLS coefficient on the IBM dummy of 2.021
indicates that, on average, IBM models' market share was over seven times higher than that of the omitted firms' models, controlling for quality-adjusted prices of models. Negative coefficients on year dummies indicate the decrease over time in market shares of individual models. It is worth noting that when firm and year dummies were omitted from the market share regression, price coefficients remained unchanged, which confirmed the robustness of the estimated elasticities.
As the market became more competitive, I expected the leading firms' advantage to diminish. To test whether the firm effects declined over time, I included firm-year interaction dummies for all major companies. Almost all of the interaction terms were negative, indicating a decline in firm effects over time. The coefficients are in Table 6 . The estimated brand effect decline ranged from 26% for IBM to 99% for Radio Shack over the 13-year period.
(4) Established brandsF inally, I tested Schmalensee's (1982) advantage of established brands hypothesis by comparing demand elasticities for incumbents" vs. entrants' models, as well as for new vs. older models. If Schmalensee (1982) is correct, established firms" models should have lower demand elasticities, due to their reputation. To test the hypothesis that entrants face higher demand elasticity for their models, both an entrant dummy and an interaction of the price terms with an -19-entrant dummy were included in the second-stage market share regression. Similarly, model age and its interaction with price were included.
Entrants' models ha-ce a significantly lower market share than incumbents' models (the entrant dummy coefficient was negative and significant). However, although the interaction of the own price term with an entrant dummy was negative, indicating more elastic demand for entrants' models, the coefficient was not statistically significant,~2
While the difference in price elasticities between incumbents and entrants is small, the average elasticity does seem to decrease with a model's age (Table 7) . Models' age did not appear significant when treated continuously, but when the own price term was included separately for each age cohort, the price elasticity coefficients did decrease in absolute value for each of the initial few years (see Table 8 ). The results show that a model that has been on the market for one or two years faces more inelastic demand than a completely new brand just entering the market, because of reputation and marketing of individual models. The difference disappears after the initial couple of years on the market, average price elasticities for incumbents and entrants Incumbents faced more inelastic demand in statistically significant. 
VI. Profitability
The increased competitiveness was likely reflected in the industry's profitability. With 22 Entrants do, however, face significantly higher cross-elasticities of demand than incumbents do. Pooling of the two groups was tested using the Chow test. Join~c regression was rejected at the 5% level, but could not be rejected when the interaction terms were included. I calculated implied average annual price-cost margins for individual computer models using the 2SLS estimates of demand elasticities, according to the Lerner index above. As Figure   5 shows, the implied average profit margins for individual models in the PC industry declined over time, from 35% at the beginning of the sample, to less than 15% at the end.
Another way of assessing the implied changes in industry profitability is by utilizing a measure of industry concentration (the Herfindahl index), as well as the total demand elasticity, and implementing the Lerner index23:
FI Herf TR
The ratio of the Herfindahl index to the elasticity of demand (equal to the profit-revenue ratio) over time is plotted in Figure 6 . The industry profit-revenue ratio declined on average by 12.5% per year. Although for differentiated products price-cost margin computation is more complex, 24 23 From Cowling and Waterson (1976) . Their results, as well as other studies, suggest that while cross-sectional or inter-industry .studies linking markups with concentration and elasticity measures are questionable, there is a clearer link between changes in profitability and in concentration/demand elasticities intra-industry over time. See Schmalensee (1989) for a survey.
See Wa~erson (1984) , chapter 2 for details. 
VH. Summary and Conclusions
The paper presents a model of market demand based on utility maximization, and market supply based on profit maximization, for goods differentiated in several attributes. Using data on personal computers and applying two-stage least squares, I estimate demand elasticities. The elasticities vary across computer models according to their market power, as measured by distances between models in a quality space. The estimates are consistent with the increasingly competitive structure of the industry the demand elasticities increase over time, while the brand effect on model market share declines. I find that incumbent firms and older models face more inelastic ttemand, because of brand reputation and marketing effects.
Based on the demand elasticity estimates, I use two methods of assessing changes in industry profitability over time: I apply the Lerner index of monopoly power to calculate pricecost markups on individual models, and use a ratio of the I-Ierfindahl index to the elasticities of demand to obtain the total industry profit-revenue ratio. I find a significant decline in industry profitability over time with both measures. As the industry became more competitive and -22 -demand elasticities increased, rates of return to investment in technology declined over time.
The paper builds on the relatively small set of empirical studies analyzing demand and supply for differentiated goods. The distance measure makes the model flexible by allowing for heterogeneous estimates of demand elasticities without imposing arbitrary cross-elasticity constraints. The paper utilizes hedonic regression methods in a new way. The results could help predict demand effects of price changes in various segments of a market, as well as effects of changes in an industry's market structure over time. In the case of industries with relatively low model turnover, effects on the change in market shares over time could be estimated, instead of levels. In the PC industry, however, few models survive beyond their first year.
The accuracy of the estimation could be improved if better demand and supply instruments were available. Future empirical studies should focus on individual taste distribution, since endogeneity of taste in a market with continuously evolving technology could be incorporated. On the supply side, a firm-level cost measure could provide a good instrument.
As is usually the case, availability of more data would expand empirical possibilities. Year dummy coefficients omitted for clarity (see Table 4 for similar results).
-25 - * Firm dummy coefficients omitted for clarity (see Table 2 for similar results), ** t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. 
